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Abstract
I present an explicitly solved equilibrium model for the distribution of wealth and in-
come in an incomplete-markets economy. I ¯rst propose a self-insurance model with
an inter-temporally dependent preference (Uzawa (1968), Lucas and Stokey (1984), and
Obstfeld (1990)). I then derive an analytical consumption rule which captures stochas-
tic precautionary saving motive and generates stationary wealth accumulation. Finally,
I provide a complete characterization for the equilibrium cross-sectional distribution of
wealth and income in closed form by developing a recursive formulation for the moments
of the distribution of wealth and income. Using this recursive formulation, I show that
income persistence and the degree of wealth mean reversion are the main determinants of
wealth-income correlation and relative dispersions of wealth to income, such as skewness
and kurtosis ratios between wealth and income.
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Empirically, labor income and ¯nancial wealth are cross-sectionally positively skewed and fat-
tailed. Furthermore, wealth is even more skewed and fat-tailed than income. For example, the
1992 Survey of Consumer Finance reports that the top one percent of U.S. households make
15% of total income, but hold 30% of total wealth. Building on Bewley (1986), Aiyagari (1994)
and Huggett (1993) provide a framework to analyze the cross-sectional wealth distribution in
an equilibrium setting, based on agents' intertemporal optimal consumption-saving decisions.
These incomplete-markets models, often referred to as Bewley models, have a large number of
ex ante identical, but ex post heterogeneous in¯nitely-lived agents who trade a single risk-free
asset to partially smooth their consumption over time against stochastic uninsurable labor
income shocks. Both goods and asset markets clear. The di®erent realizations of income
shocks for di®erent agents imply that the cross-sectional asset holdings and income levels
are di®erent for agents. While realizations are di®erent, the cross-sectional distribution of
wealth and income remains stable over time. The Bewley model has become the workhorse
to understand the equilibrium cross-sectional wealth distribution. Quadrini and R¶ ios-Rull
(1997) summarize both dynastic (in¯nite horizon) and life-cycle versions of these Bewley
models up to late 1990s. Recently, signi¯cant progress has been made on generalizing these
quantitative Bewley-style models by incorporating more realistic features in order to better
explain the highly skewed and fat-tailed empirical wealth distribution. Cagetti and De Nardi
(2005b) provide a comprehensive and up-to-date summary of this literature including both
the key empirical facts and the performance of various economic models.
In order to characterize the equilibrium wealth distribution, I ¯rst construct and then ex-
plicitly solve an incomplete-markets consumption-saving model. I follow Uzawa (1968), Lucas
and Stokey (1984), and Obstfeld (1990) to assume that the agent whose past consumption is
higher has a larger discount rate for his future consumption. This is a convenient and also
intuitive way to link the past consumption path with current consumption via inter-temporal
dependence. A higher discount rate for the agent when he is richer helps to deliver a station-
ary wealth process. These are precisely the insights of Uzawa (1968), Epstein (1983), and
Obstfeld (1990) in their work on endogenous discounting and growth in deterministic set-
tings. I extend their analysis to a stochastic setting under incomplete markets. The second
key assumption is that the agent has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility, fol-
lowing precautionary saving models such as Caballero (1990), Kimball and Mankiw (1989),
1Merton (1971) and Wang (2003). These modeling choices are partly motivated by analytical
tractability. Zeldes (1989) noted in his abstract \no one has derived closed-form solutions for
consumption with stochastic labor income and constant relative risk aversion utility."
Unlike typical CARA-utility-based, incomplete-markets consumption models such as Ca-
ballero (1991), the newly proposed model generates a stochastic precautionary savings de-
mand. This feature comes from the conditional heteroskedasticity of the income process,
which has rich implications. For example, the process implies that a higher level of income
implies a more volatile stream of future incomes (in levels). Therefore, his precautionary
saving is larger when his income level is higher. Equivalently stated, the agent consumes less
out of his human wealth, the present discounted value of future labor incomes, than out of his
¯nancial wealth.1 Moreover, the model allows for large and unexpected changes in income.
I model these movements by embedding jumps into the a±ne processes.2 Note that the
stochastic precautionary savings demand is necessary to generate predictions such as excess
sensitivity and excess smoothness, which are consistent with empirical evidence documented
in Flavin (1981) and Campbell and Deaton (1989). The stochastic precautionary savings
demand is also predicted in constant-relative-risk-averse (CRRA) utility based models such
as Carroll (1997).
To sum up, the agent's decision problem with the following three key features: (i) an
inter-temporally dependent preference with endogenous discounting; (ii) a CARA utility-
based precautionary saving model and (iii) a conditionally heteroskedastic income process
which allows for skewness, kurtosis and large discrete movements (jumps) due to unexpected
shocks. The proposed model generates a realistic bu®er-stock saving behavior with stochastic
precautionary savings demand in an analytically tractable way.
Using the explicitly solved consumption-saving rule, I develop an analytical model of equi-
librium wealth distribution. Like Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993), my model has dynastic
(in¯nitely lived) agents whose saving behavior may be described by bu®er-stock models. My
model also generates the key equilibrium restriction of dynastic Bewley models (e.g. Aiyagari
(1994) and Huggett (1993)): The cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income is equal to
the long-run stationary distribution of income and wealth for a representative in¯nitely lived
agent. Unlike the numerical methods used in papers such as Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
1See Friedman (1957) for his conjecture on this property of the consumption rule. See Zeldes (1989) for
numerical work and Wang (2006) for an analytical model supporting this property of the consumption rule.
2A±ne processes are widely used in ¯nancial economics. See Vasicek (1977), Cox, Ingersoll, Jr., and Ross
(1985) and Dai and Singleton (2000) for applications in term structure. See Du±e, Pan, and Singleton (2000)
for a±ne processes and the transform analysis.
2(1993), I solve for the equilibrium wealth distribution by developing a closed-form recur-
sive formulation for the moments of the cross-sectional stationary distribution of wealth and
income. The analytical tractability comes from (i) the linear bu®er-stock saving rule and
(ii) the a±ne income process. More importantly, my model provides additional economic
insights on some determinants of the wealth distribution in dynastic Bewley models. For
example, since the individual agent's wealth is proportional to a weighted sum of his past
incomes, \averaging" makes the cross-sectional (standardized) wealth3 smoother than the
cross-sectional (standardized) income, ceteris paribus. However, for riskier income process (a
higher degree of conditional heteroskedasticity), the agent may have a stronger precautionary
motive, which tends to make wealth more dispersed than income. The analytical tractability
of the model also allows me to show that income persistence and the degree of wealth mean
reversion are the main determinants of wealth-income correlation and relative dispersions of
wealth to income, such as skewness and kurtosis ratios between wealth and income.
Unfortunately, bu®er-stock saving models which are at the core of dynastic Bewley models
have di±culties in explaining the saving behavior of the rich. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes
(2004) ¯nd that the rich people (under various de¯nitions) save a larger fraction of their
income than the poor, inconsistent with insights based on bu®er-stock models. Moreover,
bu®er-stock dynastic equilibrium models can not generate enough wealth concentration at the
right tail of the distribution. These dynastic models place a stringent equilibrium restriction
that the cross-sectional distribution must equal a representative dynasty's long-run stationary
distribution. In order to ensure a stationary wealth distribution in dynastic bu®er-stock-
saving-based models, the wealth-rich need to de-cumulate his wealth at a su±ciently high
rate to ensure that wealth process mean reverts.4
Aiming to improve the quantitative performance of dynastic Bewley models, Quadrini
(2000) introduces (endogenous) entrepreneurship, and allows for (i) capital market imperfec-
tions; (ii) (additional) uninsurable entrepreneurial risk; and (iii) costly external ¯nancing.
These features provide additional incentives for entrepreneurs to save.5 Quadrini (2000) de-
livers cross-sectional wealth distributions for both entrepreneurs and workers. The economy-
wide cross-sectional wealth distribution is a weighted average of those for entrepreneurs and
3Standardized wealth is a linear transformation of the cross-sectional wealth: Taking cross-sectional wealth
and subtracting its mean, and ¯nally dividing by its standard deviation gives \standardized" wealth.
4For example, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth when the dynasty is rich has to be higher
than the interest rate in these models. Otherwise, wealth is not stationary.
5Here, entrepreneurship is endogenous. We shall broadly interpret entrepreneurs as both the current ones
and those households who plan to take on entrepreneurial activities in the (near) future.
3workers. This heterogeneity between entrepreneurs and workers allows room for more con-
centrated wealth in the economy because the entrepreneurs and workers may have di®erent
saving behavior. The key restriction in dynastic Bewley models, the cross-sectional distribu-
tion is equal to the long-run stationary distribution for any representative agent, is no longer
required. For example, in his model, entrepreneurs are richer on average than workers due
to the three features he introduced.6 However, compared to data, Quadrini (2000) still falls
short of generating enough asset holdings by the very richest households.
Both baseline and extended dynastic models ignore the life-cycle dimension of the savings
decision. Building on the life-cycle wealth distribution model of Huggett (1996), De Nardi
(2004) shows that adding voluntary bequests and inter-generational transmission of human
capital help to generate a more skewed and fat-tailed wealth distribution relative to the
income distribution. Bequests are a luxury good in her model and thus intuitively, the rich
leave more to their children. Moreover, the inter-generational human capital link generates
a greater degree of heterogeneity across households and hence induces even more persistent
wealth dynamics.
The third class of wealth distribution models contains both dynastic and life-cycle fea-
tures. Casta~ neda, D¶ iaz-Gim¶ enez, and R¶ ios-Rull (2003) show that a very risky income process
for the richest may generate su±cient wealth dispersion in a life-cycle model with dynastic
households. The key intuition is that the rich continues to save at a very high rate due to
extremely large uninsurable income shocks. Households may thus accumulate wealth at a
very high rate, even when they are rich. Households have di®erent marginal propensities to
save during their retirement and working stages. The economy-wide cross-sectional wealth
distribution in Casta~ neda et al. (2003) is a weighted average of the wealth distribution for
workers and that for retirees. Given the strong precautionary saving motive (even by the
rich worker) and the heterogeneity between workers and retirees, the cross-sectional wealth
distribution may thus be more concentrated than those in dynastic Bewley models such as
Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993).
In an ambitious and comprehensive paper, Cagetti and De Nardi (2005a) introduce a
key friction, imperfect enforcement in the credit markets, into a quantitative life-cycle model
with inter-generational altruism, by building on Quadrini (2000). While entrepreneurs have
6Krusell and Smith (1998) extend the dynastic models to allow for the dynasty's discount rate to follow
a Markov chain process. The stochastic discount rate generates heterogeneity in the dynasty's saving rates
over time and hence enough concentration for the wealth distribution. Krusell and Smith (1998) also make a
methodological contribution by extending the analysis of wealth distribution to allow for aggregate °uctuations.
4higher expected rates of return from their investment opportunities, entrepreneurs also have
stronger incentives to save in order to mitigate the credit constraints/collateral requirements.
Moreover, the ingredient of voluntary bequests also helps to enhance the dispersion of wealth,
similar to the intuition in De Nardi (2004). Compared with Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and
De Nardi (2005a) obtain a better ¯t for the richest by endogenizing the ¯rm size distrib-
ution. Their model matches well the wealth distributions for both entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs. The heterogeneity (workers versus entrepreneurs) plus the higher shadow value
of saving for entrepreneurs (due to credit market frictions) generate a large concentration of
wealth in the hands of the richest.
Finally, my paper also relates to Benhabib and Bisin (2006). While both papers study the
wealth distribution, the focuses and modeling methods of the two papers are rather di®erent.
Benhabib and Bisin (2006) study the e®ects of redistributive ¯scal policies on the wealth
distribution. I analyze the dispersion of cross-sectional wealth relative to the dispersion of
cross-sectional income in a self-insurance setting. Unlike Benhabib and Bisin (2006) which
ignores labor income, I use the a±ne jump di®usion process to model stochastic income,
derive the optimal consumption rule under incomplete markets, and then characterize the
endogenous joint distribution of income and wealth. While Benhabib and Bisin (2006) allow
for bequests in an overlapping generations model of Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), my
paper is based on in¯nitely lived agents. Finally, unlike Benhabib and Bisin (2006) which
study both transitions and the steady state, this paper focuses on the stationary cross-
sectional equilibrium distribution of income and wealth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the in-
dividual agent's optimal consumption problem. Section 3 solves for the optimal consumption
and saving rules explicitly. Section 4 computes the joint distribution of income and wealth
in closed form and discusses the model-implied properties of the joint distribution. Section 5
concludes. Appendices contain technical details.
2 An Income Fluctuation Problem
An individual agent solves a version of the canonical intertemporal self-insurance problem.7
He lives forever and receives uninsurable labor income, governed by an exogenously-speci¯ed
stochastic process. For technical convenience, I cast the model in continuous time. He
can borrow or lend at a constant risk-free interest rate that is determined in equilibrium.
7Chapter 16 in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) provides an introduction to this class of models.
5Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 introduce the stochastic income process and the agent's intertemporal
preference, respectively.
2.1 Income Process
Empirically, the conditional variance of changes in income increases with the level of income.
That is, the labor-income process is conditionally heteroskedastic. Furthermore, income is
subject to unexpected large shocks, such as promotions, demotions, and unemployment.8
These events often happen at low frequencies, but the potential quantitative movements of
income may be signi¯cant. A natural way to treat these events is with \jumps." Once in a
while, with some probability, the agent receives a large \surprise" movement in his income.
Moreover, labor income is empirically positively skewed, fat-tailed, and bounded from below.
Motivated by these considerations, I model income using the a±ne jump-di®usion process
by generalizing the income process introduced in Wang (2006). An a±ne process allows for
a monotonic relationship between the conditional variance of changes in labor income and
the level of income parsimoniously. This class of stochastic processes is quite °exible for
capturing a variety of empirical regularities such as conditional heteroskedasticity, skewness,
and kurtosis. In addition, the a±ne process may capture large and unexpected movements
in income by allowing the income process to jump by a random amount at a random time.
A frequently adopted income model postulates that the logarithm of income, rather than
the level of income, is a conditionally homoskedastic Markov process.9 This logarithmic
model also implies that the conditional variance of the level of income increases in the level
of income.10 However, the conditionally homoskedastic logarithmic income process does not
capture the large and unexpected movements in income, as a±ne (jump-di®usion) models do.
A±ne processes are also more convenient to work with, because they allow for closed-form
optimal consumption rules as shown in Section 3.11 Another widely used income process is the
autoregressive moving-average (ARMA) process, because of its analytical tractability. Unlike
the ARMA process, the a±ne process is conditionally heteroskedastic, and hence is able
to capture empirical regularities, such as positive skewness and excess kurtosis. Moreover,
the autoregressive income process is a special case of an a±ne process, with conditionally
8See Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for empirical evidence.
9See MaCurdy (1982) and Deaton (1991), for example.
10If the percentage change of income is conditionally heteroskedastic, then the total change of income must
be conditionally heteroskedastic.
11There exists no closed-form consumption rule for conditionally homoskedastic logarithmic income process
in any precautionary saving model.
6homoskedastic income shocks.
Suppose that the income process y is given by the following stochastic di®erential equation
(SDE):
dyt = (® ¡ ·yt) dt +
p
l0 + l1yt dWt + dZt; t ¸ 0; y0 given; (1)
where W is a standard Brownian motion on the real line R, and Z is a pure jump process.
For each realized jump, the size of the jump is drawn from a ¯xed probability distribution
º on R. The intensity at which the jump occurs, ¸(y), is stochastic and depends upon the
underlying income. I further assume that the jump intensity is a±ne in the level of income,
in that
¸(y) = ¸0 + ¸1y; (2)
for non-negative coe±cients ¸0 and ¸1. That is, the model allows the probability of jumps
to be time-varying and to depend on the level of income.12
Let ±j denote the jth moment of the jump size with respect to the jump probability
measure º, in that ±j =
R
R zj dº(z), for j ¸ 1. The Laplace transform ³(¢) of the jump
distribution º is de¯ned by ³(k) ´
R
R ekz dº(z); for any k such that the integral exists. When
the expected jump size of income is not zero (±1 6= 0), jumps lead to additional expected
changes of income over time, that is, the expected instantaneous rate of change of y is then
given by (® ¡ ·y + (¸0 + ¸1y)±1).
Following Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978), I de¯ne human wealth as follows:
De¯nition 1 Human wealth ht at time t is the expected present value of future labor income,
discounted at the risk-free interest rate r, given the agent's information set Ft at time t. That
is,
ht = Et
µZ 1
t
e¡r(s¡t)ys ds
¶
; (3)
where Et denotes Ft-conditional expectation.
Equation (3) does not take the riskiness of the income process into account. The interest
rate r is assumed to be strictly positive.13 In order to ensure that human wealth is ¯nite, I
12There are two cases to consider in terms of the parameter admissibility. If the Brownian innovations are
conditionally homoskedastic (l1 = 0), then the jump intensity is restricted to be constant (¸1 = 0), in order to
ensure that the jump intensity ¸(y) is positive, for all possible values of income y. If the Brownian innovations
are conditionally heteroskedastic (l1 > 0), then ¸0l1 ¡ ¸1l0 > 0 is necessary, and the distribution º supports
only positive jumps. Furthermore, ®l1 + ·l0 > 0 is required, in order for the instantaneous drift ¹(¢) to be
positive, at y = ¡l0=l1, the lower boundary.
13It is straightforward to provide conditions to support a positive interest rate in equilibrium as shown later
in Section 4.1.
7also assume that r + ·y > 0, where
·y = · ¡ ¸1±1: (4)
The parameter ·y is the e®ective rate of mean reversion. The second term in (4) incorporates
the e®ect of the jump component on the degree of income persistence. If the income process
is given by (1), then human wealth is a±ne in current income y, in that
ht =
1
r + ·y
³
yt +
®y
r
´
; (5)
where ·y is given in (4), and ®y = ® + ¸0±1 : Note that ®y is the constant component of the
drift function for income, and the second term ¸0±1 captures the e®ect due to jumps.
2.2 Agent's Preference
The standard preference assumption in the consumption-saving literature is a time additive
separable utility. However, there is substantial amount of work that challenges the expected
utility models. For example, Obstfeld (1990) stated that \mathematical convenience, rather
than innate plausibility, has always been the main rationale for assuming time-additive pref-
erences in economic modeling." Koopmans (1960) and Koopmans, Diamond, and Williamson
(1964) initiated the modern work on generalizing the expected utility to allow for non time-
additive, but rather inter-temporally dependent preferences. This class of preferences is often
dubbed as recursive preferences.
In this paper, I follow this literature on recursive preferences and assume that the agent's
time rate of preference is not constant, and instead depends on the agent's past cumulative
consumption. Indeed, the recursive preference has been used in many branches of economics.
Uzawa (1968) pioneered the use of this inter-temporally dependent discount function in his
work on growth. Epstein (1983) uses this recursive utility to study growth in a stochas-
tic setting. Lucas and Stokey (1984) analyzes growth with heterogenous consumers whose
preferences are inter-temporally dependent as in Uzawa (1968). Bergman (1985) studies the
intertemporal capital asset pricing implications using this recursive (non-time additive) pref-
erence. Obstfeld (1990) develops geometric methods to analyze optimal consumption rules
with such preferences. Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996) provide a good introduction to this re-
cursive preference in discrete time and in a deterministic setting.14 I extend the analysis
of Obstfeld (1990) in the deterministic setting to the stochastic setting where labor income
shocks are uninsurable and hence markets are incomplete.
14See Supplement B to Chapter 2 from page 722 to 726.
8Formally, I suppose that the agent has the following preference:
U(c) = E
·Z 1
0
exp
µ
¡
Z t
0
¯(cu)du
¶
u(ct)dt
¸
: (6)
I assume a linear relationship for the instantaneous discounting function ¯(¢), in that
¯(c) = ¯0 + ¯c c: (7)
When ¯c = 0, then the agent's utility becomes the standard time-additive separable utility.
I follow Obstfeld (1990) and Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996) and assume that the agent becomes
more impatient when his past consumption is higher. Because consumption increases in
wealth, ceteris paribus, equation (7) with a positive ¯c implies that the richer agent is more
impatient. I will show later that a positive ¯c helps to deliver a stationary wealth distribution.
Intuitively, a stronger incentive to consume for the richer agent narrows the wealth dispersion
over time and hence generates a stationary wealth distribution. If we make the alternative
assumption that the agent is more patient when his past consumption is higher(¯c < 0),
then the agent's marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is less than the interest rate,
as we will show later. As a result, the agent's wealth process is then no longer stationary.
In an economy with in¯nitely lived agents, the cross-sectional wealth distribution is then
non-stationary. We rule this situation out by requiring ¯c > 0.
In order to derive an analytical consumption rule under an incomplete markets setting,
I follow Merton (1971), Kimball and Mankiw (1989), Caballero (1991) and Wang (2004) to
assume that the period utility function is constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), in that
u(c) = ¡e¡°c=°, with ° > 0: Although CARA utility lacks wealth e®ects, it still captures
stochastic precautionary saving demand, provided that we use conditionally heteroskedastic
income process.
One key prediction of CRRA-utility-based self insurance models such as those of Huggett
(1993) and Aiyagari (1994) is that the agent engages in bu®er-stock saving in equilibrium.
Bu®er-stock saving means that the agent aims at a target level of wealth. If his wealth
is above the target level, the agent dis-saves. If his wealth is below the target level, he
saves. In general, the CRRA utility model predicts that consumption rule is concave (Carroll
and Kimball (1996)). However, quantitatively, the consumption rule is approximately linear,
provided that the agent's wealth level is not close to zero.15 The other important prediction of
the CRRA-utility-based consumption model is that the agent has a stochastic precautionary
savings demand (Carroll (1997)).
15See Zeldes (1989) and Deaton (1991).
9It is worth noting that our recursive utility with CARA speci¯cation also generates (i)
the bu®er-stock saving behavior and (ii) the stochastic precautionary savings, the same two
key features mentioned above for CRRA utility based models. An explicitly-solved optimal
consumption rule substantially simpli¯es the analysis of the cross-sectional distribution of
income and wealth. I further exploit the analytical tractability of the explicit consumption
rule to derive higher-order moments of the distribution of wealth and income. This recursive
formulation completely characterizes the equilibrium distribution, and moreover, provides
additional insights on the determinants of the distribution of income and wealth, as we will
show later.
As in standard consumption models, I assume that the agent can invest in one risk-free
asset. Let x denote the agent's ¯nancial wealth. His wealth accumulation is given by:
dxt = (rxt + yt ¡ ct)dt; (8)
with an initial wealth endowment x0: The agent's optimization problem is to choose his con-
sumption process c to maximize his utility given in (6), subject to an exogenously speci¯ed
labor-income process y given in (1), the wealth accumulation equation (8), and the transver-
sality condition limt!1 E
£
e¡rtjJ(xt;yt)j
¤
= 0.
3 Optimal Consumption and Saving
In this section, I ¯rst derive the consumption rule and discuss the intuition behind the policy
rule in Subsection 3.1. Then, I decompose the saving motives implied by the consumption
rule in Subsection 3.2, and uses the decomposition result to provide some insights on the
determinants of the saving rule.
3.1 Consumption Rule
Let J(x;y) denote the corresponding value function. By a standard argument, the value
function J(x;y) solves the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
0 = sup
¹ c
©
u(¹ c) ¡ ¯(¹ c)J(x;y) + D¹ cJ(x;y)
ª
; (9)
where
D¹ cJ(x;y) = (rx + y ¡ ¹ c)Jx(x;y) + (® ¡ ·y)Jy(x;y) +
1
2
(l0 + l1y)Jyy(x;y)
+ (¸0 + ¸1y)E[J(x;y + q) ¡ J(x;y)]; (10)
10and where q has probability distribution º: The last term in (10) captures the e®ect of jumps,
and E is taken with respect to the jump distribution º:
The ¯rst-order condition (FOC) for the HJB equation is
u0(¹ c) = e¡°¹ c = Jx + ¯cJ: (11)
Unlike the FOC for an expected utility agent, the second term ¯cJ on the right side of
(11) captures the e®ect of endogenous discounting ¯(¢) on the agent's tradeo®. The agent
who discounts his future more when his past consumption is greater (¯c > 0), has stronger
incentives to consume in order to keep the discount rate for his future consumption from being
too high, ceteris paribus. The FOC (11) states that the marginal utility of consumption u0(¹ c)
is less than the marginal value of saving Jx at the agent's optimality. (Note that the value
function J(x;y) < 0, because the felicity function in each period u(c) = ¡e¡°c=° < 0 for any
consumption level.)
Using the standard guess-and-verify procedure, I derive a linear consumption rule in
closed form. The following proposition reports the optimal consumption rule, and Appendix
A contains the details involved in the derivations.
Proposition 1 The optimal consumption rule is a±ne in ¯nancial wealth x and current
labor income y, in that, for all t,
c¤
t = ! (xt + ayyt + ¹ a); (12)
where
! = r + ·x; (13)
·x = ¯c=°; (14)
ay =
ah
r + ·y
; (15)
¹ a =
1
r
·
¯0 ¡ r
°!
+
µ
®y
r + ·y
¡ ¸0¡(²)
¶
ah ¡
1
2
¢0a2
h
¸
; (16)
0 = ¡1 + (1 + ¸1¡(²))ah +
1
2
¢1a2
h; (17)
¡(²) =
1
r + ·y
µ
±1 +
1
²
(³(¡²) ¡ 1)
¶
; (18)
² = °!ay; (19)
¢i =
°!li
(r + ·y)2; for i = 0;1: (20)
11Next, I show that the model predicts stochastic precautionary savings, a key feature of
incomplete-markets consumption models. The optimal consumption rule (12) may also be
expressed in terms of ¯nancial wealth x and human wealth h given in (5), in that
c¤
t = ! (xt + ahht ¡ b0); (21)
where
b0 =
1
r
µ
1
2
¢0a2
h + ¸0¡(²)ah ¡
¯0 ¡ r
°!
¶
: (22)
For the purpose of future reference, I call ah, the ratio between the MPC out of human wealth
and that out of ¯nancial wealth, the MPC ratio. Equation (17) implies that the MPC ratio,
ah is always less than one. This inequality holds strictly, when the conditional variance of
labor income depends directly on its level (l1 > 0 or ¸1 > 0). The intuition is that, with
an increase in income, \human" wealth has increased, but its volatility has also increased
(l1 > 0); therefore, the prudent agent (Kimball (1990)) increases his consumption out of his
\human" wealth less than proportionally. In particular, if the jump intensity is constant
(¸1 = 0), then (17) specializes to the following quadratic equation:
0 =
¢1
2
a2
h + ah ¡ 1: (23)
In general, (23) has two roots, for conditionally heteroskedastic income. I discard the negative
root, since it implies a negative MPC out of current income y. The positive root lies between
zero and one, and is given by
ah =
2
p
1 + 2¢1 + 1
: (24)
That the MPC ratio, ah, is less than one implies that consumption responds less to a unit
increase in human wealth than a unit increase in ¯nancial wealth, because of the precautionary
motive.
I use the following metric to quantify the agent's precautionary savings motive.
De¯nition 2 Let c¤ be the optimal consumption characterized by (21), given ¯nancial wealth
x and human wealth h. Let cp be the corresponding certainty-equivalence (l0 = l1 = 0 = ¸0 =
¸1) consumption. Then, the precautionary savings premium is ¼ ´ cp ¡ c¤:
The precautionary savings premium then is given by
¼t = !
·
(1 ¡ ah)ht +
1
2r
¢0a2
h +
¸0
r
¡(²)ah
¸
=
!
r
(Át + »t); (25)
12where
Át =
1
2
(¢0 + ¢1rht)a2
h =
°!a2
y
2
¾2(rht); (26)
»t = (¸0 + ¸1rht)¡(²)ah = ah¡(°!ay)¸(rht): (27)
The terms Át and »t capture the e®ects of the di®usion risk and the jump risk on the pre-
cautionary savings demand, respectively (Note that they are proportional to the conditional
variance ¾2(¢), and the jump intensity ¸(¢), respectively). Recall our earlier discussion on
the e®ect of conditional heteroskedasticity of income (l1 > 0 or ¸1 > 0) on the MPC ratio ah.
When the agent's income is higher, his income risk is bigger. Hence, his precautionary saving
demand is higher. However, the precautionary saving does not depend on the agent's wealth
level. That is, the precautionary saving is the same for the wealth-rich and the wealth-poor
in this model.
Next, I provide a saving decomposition analysis that allows us to better understand the
model's implications on saving.
3.2 Saving Decomposition
Let g(x;y) be the optimal saving rule, in that g(xt;yt) = st = dxt=dt. Substituting the
consumption rule (12) into wealth accumulation equation (8) gives
g(x;y) = ¡·xx + Ãy + ·0; (28)
where ·x = ¯c=°, and
Ã = 1 ¡ !ay =
r(1 ¡ ah) + ·y ¡ ·xah
r + ·y
; (29)
·0 = ¡!¹ a: (30)
Under the assumption that the agent's subjective discount rate ¯(c) increases with his con-
sumption (·x > 0), the marginal propensity to save out of ¯nancial wealth, ¡·x is negative.
Intuitively, a higher ·x makes the agent attach lower values to his future consumption, and
hence encourages him to dis-save out of his ¯nancial wealth at a higher rate by consuming
more now, ceteris paribus. Note that the rate ·x at which he dis-saves out of his ¯nancial
wealth is independent of his labor income. Now consider the alternative assumption: ·x < 0.
Then, the MPS out of ¯nancial wealth is positive. In such a setting, the agents' incentive to
save is stronger. While this certainly helps to generate a concentrated wealth distribution in
13equilibrium, in dynastic model, it leads to non-stationarity. However, in overlapping genera-
tion models with ¯nitely lived agents, a negative ·x may be desirable in terms of generating
a more concentrated wealth distribution than income distribution. This to some extent is in
line with the empirical observation that the rich save more as documented by Dynan et al.
(2004) and others.
For a general a±ne income process (1), the savings rate (28) may be decomposed into the
three components:
s¤
t = ¼t + ft ¡ jt; (31)
where
ft =
·yyt ¡ ®y
r + ·y
; (32)
jt = ·x (xt + ht) +
¯0 ¡ r
°r
=
¯0 + ·x°r(xt + ht) ¡ r
°r
=
¯ (r(xt + ht)) ¡ r
°r
; (33)
and ¯(c) = ¯0 + ¯cc is the stochastic discounting function given in (7). The ¯rst term ¼t is
the precautionary savings and is given in (25).
The second term ft captures the agent's motive of smoothing consumption over time,
even in the absence of stochastic shocks. If the agent's saving s¤
t = ft, then his behavior
is completely characterized by the permanent-income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) and
the martingale consumption model of Hall (1978). Campbell (1987) dubbed this behavior
\savings for a rainy day." This saving component exists in any forward-looking consumption
model. It is worth emphasizing that \savings for a rainy day" as de¯ned in Campbell (1987)
and here is unrelated to precautionary savings and is purely driven by the expected changes of
income over time. Therefore, the key determinant of saving ft for rainy days is the persistence
of the income process. If ·y · 0, the agent's income grows over time in expectation, and
hence he borrows against his future income (ft < 0). If ·y > 0, income is stationary, and
then \savings for a rainy day" is
ft =
·y
r + ·y
(yt ¡ ¹ y); (34)
where
¹ y =
®y
·y
=
® + ¸0±1
· ¡ ¸1±1
(35)
is the long-run mean of income. Equivalently, and more intuitively, I may express (34), using
\human" wealth, as
ft = yt ¡ rht = ·y(ht ¡ ¹ h); (36)
14where the long-run mean ¹ h of human wealth is simply equal to the perpetuity of long-run
mean ¹ y of income, in that ¹ h = ¹ y=r: When ht > ¹ h, the agent's human wealth is higher than his
long-run mean ¹ h, and hence he rationally saves a portion ·y of his human wealth in excess
of long-run mean ¹ h in anticipation of future \rainy" days.
The last term jt captures the dissavings due to impatience. This part of the saving
re°ects the agent's intertemporal motives of smoothing consumption, even when his income is
deterministic. Note that the e®ect of randomness of income on consumption is fully absorbed
into precautionary savings demand ¼t. As a result, the dissavings due to impatience must be
a±ne in (xt + ht), the sum of ¯nancial and human wealth. Unlike the time-additive separable
CARA utility, this term jt is stochastic and increases in the agent's \total" wealth (xt + ht).
With ¯c > 0, the agent's dissaving increases with his \total" wealth (xt + ht). This induces
a mean reverting wealth process and hence stationary wealth distribution. This term jt
captures the intuition that richer agents are more impatient and hence dis-save more.
Having derived and analyzed the optimal consumption and saving rules, I next study the
implications on the equilibrium cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income.
4 Equilibrium Distribution of Income and Wealth
I provide a recursive and analytical approach to characterize the joint distribution of wealth
and income. I ¯rst provide a description of equilibrium and the determination of the equi-
librium interest rate.16 Then, I solve the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income
in closed form by using the equilibrium restriction that (i) the cross-sectional distribution
of wealth and income and (ii) the long-run stationary distribution of individual's wealth
and income are the same. The individual's long-run stationary distribution may be solved
from his joint wealth and income evolution dynamics. I further show that the cross-sectional
wealth is less skewed and less fat-tailed than the cross-sectional income in these models, due
to bu®er-stock saving behavior.
4.1 Equilibrium
Consider a continuum of individual agents, whose preferences and income (endowment) are
introduced in Section 2 in an equilibrium setting. These agents are ex ante identical, but
ex post generally di®erent in both asset holdings and income. Since we are interested in
16See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) for extensive textbook treatment on these Bewley-style equilibrium
wealth distribution models. The equilibrium description is related to Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993).
15the steady state cross-sectional distribution, we choose the initial distribution of wealth and
income to be the steady state one. We thus will have a stationary economy where the
individual agents' wealth and income move over time, and the cross-sectional distribution
and aggregate quantities remain invariant at all times. The equilibrium environment is a
stationary pure-exchange economy with a ¯xed supply of a risk-free asset, which the agent
uses as the saving instrument. The equilibrium interest rate is determined by market clearing.
The insights delivered in this paper may be also obtained in a production economy used in
Aiyagari (1994) by introducing a neoclassical production function and thus using capital as
the saving instrument.
We now provide a formal description of equilibrium.
De¯nition 3 A stationary equilibrium is an interest rate r, an optimal saving rule g(x;y),
and a stationary cross-sectional distribution ©(x;y) of wealth and income for which
² the saving rule g(x;y) is optimal from the individual agent's perspective;
² the stationary distribution ©(x;y) is implied by the stationary distribution of income
and the optimal saving rule g(x;y);
² The risk-free asset market clears at all time, in that
Z Z
©(x;y)g(x;y)dxdy = 0: (37)
Without loss of generality, I may normalize the initial total endowment of the risk-free
asset to zero, as in Huggett (1993). That is, I consider a pure-exchange environment. An
equilibrium production economy similar to Aiyagari (1994) may also be constructed.17
Next, I sketch out the equilibrium implications on the saving rule (28). Speci¯cally, I
show that the saving rule (28) implies that the precautionary saving demand is stochastic,
and the wealth process is stationary. Moreover, the saving rule captures the intuition that
wealth is a weighted average of past incomes.
17Alternatively, we may also support a net positive supply of assets in the economy. The economy will
have the stationary equilibrium, provided that the initial cross-sectional distribution of wealth endowment is
consistent with the steady-state cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income. One way to think about
positive aggregate wealth in an exchange economy is to view these positive initial wealth endowment as the
ownership endowment of a tree, which drops a continuous °ow of dividend at a constant rate, which is the
risk-free rate. Details are available upon request.
164.2 Stochastic Precautionary Saving and Stationary Wealth
In equilibrium, the aggregate saving (in °ow terms) is zero. Plugging (28) into the market
equilibrium condition (37) gives
¡·x¹ x + Ã¹ y + ·0 = 0: (38)
The above equation thus de¯nes the equilibrium interest rate.18 Using (38), I may write the
agent's saving rule (28) (evaluated at the equilibrium interest rate) as follows:
st = ¡·x (xt ¡ ¹ x) + Ã (yt ¡ ¹ y) ; (39)
where ¹ x is the average wealth and ¹ y is the average income. Because the economy is normalized
with a unit measure of agents, aggregate quantities such as wealth and income are the same
as the corresponding average quantities. Because all agents are ex ante identical in the model,
¹ x may be naturally interpreted as the target wealth. Note that agents discount future more
when their wealth is higher (¯c > 0). Hence, the wealth process is stationary as seen from
a negative marginal propensity to save (MPS) out of wealth (·x > 0), consistent with the
notion of bu®er stock.19
The saving rule (39) has two intuitive features: (i) wealth serves as a bu®er, °uctuating
around a ¯nite \target" level ¹ x; (ii) the agent saves out of his current income if his income
is larger than the average (yt > ¹ y), and otherwise dissaves. These two key properties of the
saving rule are precisely captured by the two saving components: the precautionary saving
term ¼t and dissaving due to impatience term jt, respectively. The stochastic precautionary
saving ¼t re°ects the conditional heteroskedasticity of the income process, which makes the
MPC ratio less than unity (ah < 1). Recall that richer agents have stronger demand for
dissaving due to a greater magnitude of impatience as seen from jt given in (33).
The linear equilibrium saving rule (39) substantially simpli¯es the analysis of the disper-
sion of the agent's endogenous wealth distribution relative to his stationary income distribu-
18The equilibrium market clearing condition is analogous to that in standard Bewley models (Aiyagari
(1994)).
19By contrast, if the agent's impatience decreases in consumption (¯c < 0), then the agent with a higher
level of consumption is more patient, and accumulates more assets. This implies that the wealth process is
not stationary, and suggests that wealth inequality widens up without bound over time in an in¯nite-horizon
equilibrium model.
17tion. Equation (39) implies that the associated stationary wealth process x satis¯es20
xt ¡ ¹ x = Ã
Z t
¡1
e¡·x(t¡s) (ys ¡ ¹ y)ds: (40)
Without loss of generality, we choose current time to be 0 and suppose that the agent's wealth
distribution have reached steady state. We may then re-write (40) as follows (with t = 0 and
u = ¡s):
x0 ¡ ¹ x =
Ã
·x
Z 1
0
wt(u)(y¡u ¡ ¹ y)du; (41)
where the weight wt(u) for (y¡u ¡ ¹ y) is given by wt(u) = ·xe¡·xu and sums to unity, in that
R 1
0 wt(u)du = 1: Equation (41) states that the deviation of long-run wealth from its mean,
(x0 ¡ ¹ x) is proportional to a weighted sum of (y¡u ¡ ¹ y), the deviation of his past income
y¡u from its long-run mean ¹ y. First, the weight wt(u) for the income deviation from its
long-run mean, (y¡u ¡ ¹ y) decays exponentially in \time distance" u at the rate of ·x. For
the agent whose discount rate increases more with his past consumption (a higher ¯c), the
agent dis-saves at a higher rate ·x = ¯c=°. As a result, a \stronger" averaging e®ect induces
a lower wealth dispersion, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, when the income risk increases
with the level of income (conditional heteroskedasticity), the agent's precautionary motive
will induce the agent to save more out of income, ceteris paribus. This suggests a higher
MPS Ã out of income, which in turn implies a more dispersed wealth distribution relative to
income. This can been seen from (41) where wealth in excess of its long-run mean, (x0 ¡ ¹ x),
is a constant multiple Ã=·x of
R 1
0 wt(u)(y¡u ¡ ¹ y)du, with the multiple increasing in the
MPS Ã. In Section 4.3, we will return to these two opposing e®ects: (i) dispersion reduction
of stationary wealth relative to stationary income due to bu®er stock saving (·x > 0) and
(ii) high precautionary saving induced by a risky (conditionally heteroskedastic) income
process.21
In order to deepen our insights, I next provide an analytical characterization for the
cross-sectional stationary distribution of wealth and income.
4.3 Cross Sectional Distribution
Let
¡
X Y
¢T be the random vector that has the cross-sectional stationary distribution ©(x;y)
of wealth and income, and ¹ =
¡
¹X ¹Y
¢0 =
¡
¹ x ¹ y
¢0 be the corresponding ¯rst moment.
20Using the de¯nition of saving st = _ xt, we apply integration by parts to the formula (39) and obtain
d[e
·xt (xt ¡ ¹ x)] = Ã (yt ¡ ¹ y)e
·xtdt:
Integrating the above from ¡1 to current time t yields (40).
21I am grateful to the referee for suggesting this line of discussions.
18Note that ¹X is equal to the target wealth ¹ x and ¹Y is equal to the long-run income ¹ y of a
representative individual. Let Mi;j be the moment of the joint distribution of income and
wealth, de¯ned below:
Mi;j ´ E
h
(X ¡ ¹X)
i (Y ¡ ¹Y )
j
i
; for i;j = 0;1;¢¢¢ : (42)
In¯nite-horizon and stationarity assumptions together imply that the stationary cross-sectional
distribution is the same as the individual's steady-state distribution. Using this equivalence,
I compute the cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income, by working with the dynam-
ics of individual income and wealth. Let w and v denote de-meaned wealth and de-meaned
income, respectively, in that wt = xt ¡ ¹X, and vt = yt ¡ ¹Y .
The joint dynamics of de-meaned wealth and de-meaned income (wt and vt) may be
written as
d
µ
wt
vt
¶
=
·µ
¡·x Ã
0 ¡·
¶µ
wt
vt
¶
+
µ
0
¹ ®
¶¸
dt +
µ
0 p
¹ l0 + l1vt
¶
dWt +
µ
0
1
¶
dZt; (43)
where ¹ ® = ® ¡ ·¹Y , and ¹ l0 = l0 + l1¹Y . The de-meaned income process v jumps at a
stochastic intensity ¹ ¸0 + ¸1v, where ¹ ¸0 = ¸0 + ¸1¹Y .
Appendix B supplies the details for the complete characterization of the cross moments
Mi;j de¯ned in (42) for any non-negative integers i and j. It shows that the cross moment
Mi;j is a linear combination of lower-order moments Mi;k, for 0 · k · j ¡ 1, and the cross
moment Mi¡1;j+1, in that
Mi;j =
1
Kij
Ã
P1(j)Mi;j¡1 + P2(j)Mi;j¡2 +
j X
n=3
Pn(j)Mi;j¡n + iÃ Mi¡1;j+1
!
; (44)
where Kij, P1(j), P2(j), and Pn(j) are given by (B.3), (B.4), (B.5), and (B.6). Since (44)
also applies to Mi¡1;j+1 and Mi;k, it is straightforward to conclude that Mi;j may be written
as a linear combination of the cross-sectional income moments M0;k, for 0 · k · i + j. This
result is intuitive and useful. It states that the cross moment Mi;j whose total order is i + j
is given by a weighted sum of income moments up to the order (i + j). As a special case of
this result (j = 0), the wealth moment of order i is only related to the income moments up
to order i, but does not depend on any income moments higher than order i.
Having developed the general recursive formulation of moments for the joint distribution,
I now analyze some speci¯c implications of the model.
19Corollary 1 The wealth moments are related to the moments of the joint wealth and income
as follows:
Mi;0 =
Ã
·x
Mi¡1;1; (45)
Mi;1 =
iÃ
i·x + ·y
Mi¡1;2: (46)
An immediate implication of the above two equations is
Mi;0 =
(i ¡ 1)Ã2
·x[(i ¡ 1)·x + ·y]
Mi¡2;2; i ¸ 2: (47)
Corollary 1 imposes a set of linear testable restrictions between the stationary moment
Mi;0 of wealth and the cross-moment Mi¡1;1, for any i ¸ 2. Using Corollary 1, I show that
the mean-reversion rates of income and wealth (·x and ·), and the MPS Ã out of income
determine the correlation coe±cient ½ and the variance ratio ¾2
X=¾2
Y between wealth and
income.
Corollary 2 The variance ratio ¾2
X=¾2
Y and the correlation coe±cient ½ between income and
wealth are given by
¾2
X
¾2
Y
=
Ã2
·x(·x + ·y)
; (48)
½ =
r
·x
·x + ·y
=
r
1
1 + ´
; (49)
respectively, where
´ = ·y=·x: (50)
The marginal propensity Ã to save out of income is in general positive. This implies a positive
correlation between income and wealth: ½ > 0. Equation (49) implies that the correlation
coe±cient ½ decreases with ´. A more persistent (lower ·y) income process implies that
current income is more correlated with the past income. Since wealth is accumulated out of
past income, this suggests a higher correlation between current income and wealth, ceteris
paribus.
The variance ratio ¾2
X=¾2
Y is a natural measure of cross-sectional wealth dispersion relative
to cross-sectional income. Clearly, the MPS Ã out of income plays a crucial role in determining
this variance ratio. When income shocks are more conditionally heteroskedastic (a higher l1
or ¸1), the MPS Ã is higher. The greater incentive to accumulate wealth will in turn make
wealth more volatile than income, giving rise to a higher variance ratio ¾2
X=¾2
Y . However,
20the variance ratio does not capture higher-order e®ects such as relative skewness and relative
fat-tails of the wealth distribution relative to the income distribution. One way to capture
these results is to use the following metric:
De¯nition 4 A measure of relative wealth-to-income inequality is
Ji ´
E [(X ¡ ¹X)=¾X]
i
E [(Y ¡ ¹Y )=¾Y ]
i =
Mi;0=¾i
X
M0;i=¾i
Y
: (51)
Trivially by construction, J2 = 1: The coe±cients J3 and J4 are the wealth-to-income skew-
ness and wealth-to-income kurtosis ratios, respectively. These relative dispersion measures
have controlled for the di®erence between the variance of wealth ¾2
X and the variance of
income ¾2
Y , because these measures are based on \standardized" wealth, (X ¡ ¹X)=¾X and
\standardized" income (Y ¡ ¹Y )=¾Y , where \standardized" random variables refer to those
with zero mean and unity variance.
Using the variance ratio (48), we may write \standardized" stationary wealth as follows:
x0 ¡ ¹X
¾X
=
p
1 + ´
Z 1
0
wt(u)
µ
y¡u ¡ ¹Y
¾Y
¶
du; (52)
where ´ = ·y=·x. Equation (52) implies that the MPS Ã does not directly a®ect the distri-
bution of \standardized" stationary wealth. This is because a higher MPS Ã out of income
increases both the variance and higher order moments for stationary wealth in such a way that
it does not a®ect the moments for the \standardized" wealth directly. Equation (52) states
that the standardized wealth is proportional to a weighted average of past \standardized" in-
comes, with a multiple larger than unity. On one hand, the multiple
p
1 + ´ being larger than
unity indicates that the \standardized" wealth is more dispersed than the weighted average
of past \standardized" income, ceteris paribus. Moreover, a higher degree of mean reversion
for income (a higher ·y and hence a higher ´ = ·y=·x) implies a larger multiple. On the
other hand, averaging past \standardized" incomes that are mean reverting further reduces
dispersion for wealth. Therefore, the moments for the standardized wealth may be either
larger or small than the (corresponding) moments for the standardized income, depending on
whether the \averaging" e®ect is stronger than the \multiple" e®ect or not. The net e®ect
of mean reversion on the relative dispersion of wealth to income is indeterminate in general.
I next present a few example economies that provide explicit solutions to the skewness and
kurtosis moments, using the general recursive formulation (44) for the moments of the joint
distribution. We show that stationary cross-sectional (standardized) wealth is less skewed and
less fat-tailed than stationary cross-sectional (standardized) income because the \averaging"
21e®ect turns out to be stronger than the \multiple" e®ect in the example economies studied
below.
4.4 A Gaussian Model of Income
If the income process (1) is conditionally homoskedastic without jumps, namely, an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, then (43) is simpli¯ed to a ¯rst-order SDE, in that
d
µ
wt
vt
¶
=
µ
¡·x Ã
0 ¡·
¶µ
wt
vt
¶
dt +
µ
0
¾0
¶
dWt; (53)
where ¹ ® = 0 by equilibrium restriction. Note that the MPS Ã out of income is given by
Ã = (· ¡ ·x)=(r + ·). Because the bi-variate process of income and wealth is conditionally
homoskedastic and Gaussian, the stationary distribution ©(x;y) of wealth and income is bi-
variate normal.22 The joint normality implies that both the marginal distribution of wealth
and that of income are Gaussian. Corollary 2 gives the variance ratio and correlation between
wealth and income, which then completely characterize the joint income-wealth distribution.
Obviously, this example provides a counter-factual prediction on the cross sectional joint
distribution, as neither cross-sectional wealth nor income is normally distributed empirically.
However, it gives a good benchmark against which we may think about the determinants of
the skewness and fat-tails of the wealth distribution.
4.5 A Conditionally Homoskedastic Jump-Di®usion Model of Income
One simple way to incorporate skewness and kurtosis into income is to generalize an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck income process as in (53) by adding a conditionally homoskedastic jump compo-
nent. That gives a special case of (1) with l1 = ¸1 = 0:
Appendix B.1 shows that the skewness and excess kurtosis ratios are given by
SX
SY
=
2
p
(1 + ´)3
(2´ + 1)(´ + 2)
· 1; (54)
KX
KY
=
3(1 + ´)
(1 + 3´)(3 + ´)
· 1; (55)
respectively. Therefore, J3 = SX=SY · 1 and J4 = (KX + 3)=(KY + 3) · 1, for all ´ > 0.
This states that cross-sectionally, wealth is less skewed and less fat-tailed than income, in
this self-insurance-based equilibrium model. As we noted earlier, the MPS Ã out of income
does not matter for either the skewness ratio J3 or the kurtosis ratio J4. This is because the
MPS Ã does not matter for the distribution of \standardized" stationary wealth.
22See Karatzas and Shreve (1991), or Appendix D in Du±e (2001).
22This jump model implies that Ã = (·¡·x)=(r+·), and thus predicts a constant precau-
tionary savings demand. A positively-skewed jump distribution º implies a positively-skewed
income distribution, which endogenously generates a positively-skewed wealth distribution.
Empirically, both income and wealth are positively skewed. This model captures the intuition
that a skewed income distribution may lead to a skewed wealth distribution.
4.6 A Conditionally Heteroskedastic Model of Income
Although Subsection 4.5 generates a model of skewed and fat-tailed wealth distribution,
the associated optimal consumption rule predicts a constant precautionary savings demand.
However, in general, precautionary saving is stochastic and depends on the level of wealth
and income. Next, I propose a model that generates stochastic precautionary saving by using
a conditionally heteroskedastic income process, a special case of (1), in that
dyt = ·(µ ¡ yt)dt + ¾
p
yt dWt: (56)
Since the conditional variance of changes in income is proportional to the level of income,
the precautionary savings demand induces a lower MPC out of human wealth than out of
¯nancial wealth.23 The stationary distribution for the income process (56) is a Gamma
distribution. Appendix B.2 shows that the skewness and kurtosis ratios are given by
SX
SY
=
2
p
1 + ´
2 + ´
· 1; (57)
KX
KY
=
5´ + 6
(3 + ´)(2 + ´)
· 1: (58)
Therefore, J3 = SX=SY · 1 and J4 = (KX + 3)=(KY + 3) · 1. This again con¯rms our
intuition that cross-sectionally, wealth is less skewed and less fat-tailed than income.
In this section, I have provided a complete characterization for the equilibrium cross-
sectional distribution of wealth and income by developing a recursive formulation for the
moments of the joint distribution of wealth and income. Using the recursive formulation,
I have illustrated that cross-sectional wealth is less skewed and less fat-tailed than cross-
sectional income by working out the details for several model economies.
23We impose the parametric restriction 2·µ ¸ ¾
2 to ensure that the boundary of zero income is never visited
in ¯nite time, and therefore, income always stays positive. See Feller (1951) and Cox, Ingersoll, Jr., and Ross
(1985).
235 Conclusions
This paper develops an incomplete markets consumption-saving model and then derives the
equilibrium cross-sectional distribution of wealth and income in closed form. It ¯rst proposes
a general income process, known as an a±ne (jump di®usion) process, which allows for
both conditional heteroskedasticity of income changes and jumps in income. This paper
then derives an explicit bu®er-stock saving rule for agents with inter-temporally dependent
preferences as in Uzawa (1968) and Obstfeld (1990). The consumption model has the desirable
property of stochastic precautionary savings.
This paper then provides an analytical solution for the stationary distribution of wealth
and income in a heterogeneous agent (Bewley-style) economy, by exploiting the analytically
tractable but also rich \a±ne" structure of the model. The analytical feature of the model
allows us to show that the individual agent's wealth is a weighted average of past incomes. In
equilibrium, the individual's long-run steady-state distribution is equal to the cross-sectional
distribution. The impatience (increasing with past consumption) helps to generate a cross-
sectional distribution for (standardized) wealth that is smoother than the cross-sectional dis-
tribution for (standardized) income. While income volatility naturally feeds into the higher
order moments of wealth, the persistence of income shocks and the mean reversion of wealth
(induced by the impatience assumption) are the main determinants of cross-sectional wealth-
income correlation and the relative dispersion of \standardized" wealth to \standardized" in-
come, such as the relative skewness and the relative kurtosis (fat-tails) of the cross-sectional
wealth to the cross-sectional income. I develop these new insights and results on wealth
distribution by providing an analytical recursive formulation for the moments of the joint
distribution of income and wealth. This recursive formulation of the moments completely
characterizes the joint distribution of wealth and income. The analytical approach developed
here provides a complementary perspective to the existing literature towards the understand-
ing of equilibrium wealth distribution.
24Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix derives the optimal consumption rule (12) reported in Proposition 1. I con-
jecture that the value function J(x;y) takes an exponential-a±ne form:
J(x;y) = ¡
1
°!
exp[¡°! (x + ayy + a0)]; (A.1)
where !; ay, and a0 are constant coe±cients to be determined. The ¯rst-order condition (11)
implies that
¹ c = ! (x + ayy + ¹ a); (A.2)
where
¹ a = ¡
1
°!
log
µ
1 ¡
¯c
°!
¶
+ a0: (A.3)
Plugging the implied values for ¹ c, Jx, Jy, and Jyy into (9) leaves
0 = ¡
1
°
µ
1 ¡
¯c
°!
¶
+ [¯0 + ¯c! (x + ayy + ¹ a)]
1
°!
+ [(r ¡ !)x + (1 ¡ !ay)y ¡ !¹ a]
+ (® ¡ ·y)ay +
1
2
(l0 + l1y) £
¡
¡°!a2
y
¢
¡ (¸0 + ¸1y)
1
°!
E
£
e¡°!ayq ¡ 1
¤
: (A.4)
Because the above equality holds for any wealth x and income y, we thus have
0 = ¯c!
1
°!
+ (r ¡ !); (A.5)
0 =
¯c!ay
°!
+ (1 ¡ !ay) ¡ ·ay ¡
°!a2
yl1
2
¡
¸1
°!
[³(¡°!ay) ¡ 1]; (A.6)
0 = ¡
1
°
µ
1 ¡
¯c
°!
¶
+
¯0 + ¯c!¹ a
°!
¡ !¹ a ¡
°!a2
yl0
2
¡
¸0
°!
[³(¡°!ay) ¡ 1]; (A.7)
where ³(¢) is the Laplace transform of the jump distribution. Simplifying (A.5), (A.6) and
(A.7) gives the form of the optimal consumption rule, reported from (12) to (20).
B Calculating Cross Moments
This appendix characterizes the cross-sectional distribution of income and wealth by com-
puting the moments. I calculate all moments Mi;j, by exploiting the recursive structure in
the drift function for the dynamics of fwi
tv
j
tg, for non-negative integers i and j.
25Under technical regularity conditions, Ito's formula implies that the drift function Dt(i; j)
of wi
tv
j
t is
Dt(i;j) = iwi¡1
t v
j
t (¡·xwt + Ãvt) + jwi
tv
j¡1
t (¹ ® ¡ ·vt) +
1
2
j (j ¡ 1)wi
tv
j¡2
t
¡¹ l0 + l1vt
¢
+
¡¹ ¸0 + ¸1vt
¢
wi
tE
h
(vt + q)
j ¡ v
j
t
i
; (B.1)
where q is the pure jump size drawn from the distribution º, and E is taken with respect to
the jump distribution. Using the binomial expansion, (B.1) implies that
Dt(i;j) = ¡(i·x + j·)(wi
tv
j
t) + j¹ ®
³
wi
tv
j¡1
t
´
+
l1
2
j(j ¡ 1)
³
wi
tv
j¡1
t
´
+
¹ l0
2
j(j ¡ 1)
³
wi
tv
j¡2
t
´
+ iÃ(wi¡1
t v
j+1
t ) +
¡¹ ¸0 + ¸1vt
¢
j¡1 X
n=0
µ
j
n
¶
±j¡n
¡
wi
tvn
t
¢
= ¡Kij(wi
tv
j
t) + P1(j)
³
wi
tv
j¡1
t
´
+ P2(j)
³
wi
tv
j¡2
t
´
+
j X
n=3
Pn(j)
³
wi
tv
j¡n
t
´
+ iÃ(wi¡1
t v
j+1
t ); (B.2)
where
Kij = i·x + j·y; (B.3)
P1(j) = j
¡
¹ ® + ¹ ¸0±1
¢
+
µ
j
2
¶
(l1 + ¸1±2) =
µ
j
2
¶
(l1 + ¸1±2); (B.4)
P2(j) =
µ
j
2
¶
¡¹ l0 + ¹ ¸0±2
¢
+
µ
j
3
¶
¸1±3; (B.5)
Pn(j) =
µ
j
n
¶
¹ ¸0±n +
µ
j
n + 1
¶
¸1±n+1; 3 · n · j; (B.6)
and ·y = ·¡¸1±1. Equation (B.4) follows ¹ ®+ ¹ ¸0±1 = ®y ¡·y¹Y = 0, using the steady-state
stationarity condition ¹Y = ®y=·y. The parameter Kij may be viewed as the rate of mean
reversion for fwi
tv
j
tg. It is equal to the sum of income and wealth mean reversion rates,
multiplied by their corresponding power.
Equation (B.2) implies that
E
³
wi
tv
j
t
´
= e¡KijtE
³
wi
0v
j
0
´
+
Z t
0
e¡Kij(t¡s)Q(j)ds
= e¡KijtE
³
wi
0v
j
0
´
+
1
Kij
¡
1 ¡ e¡Kijt¢
Q(j); (B.7)
where
Q(j) = P1(j)E
¡
wi
svj¡1
s
¢
+ P2(j)E
¡
wi
svj¡2
s
¢
+
j X
n=3
Pn(j)E
¡
wi
svj¡n
s
¢
+ iÃE
¡
wi¡1
s vj+1
s
¢
;
26and E is taken with respect to the cross-sectional stationary distribution ©(x; y). Taking the
limit t ! 1 in (B.7) gives (44).
B.1 Moments Calculations for Section 4.5
The second, third, and fourth centered moments of stationary income are
¾2
Y = M02 =
¾2
0 + ¸0±2
2·
; M03 =
¸0±3
3·
; M04 =
¸0±4
4·
+ 3M2
02:
Equation (47) implies that
M30 =
2Ã2
·x(2·x + ·)
M12 =
2Ã3
·x(2·x + ·)(·x + 2·)
M03; (B.8)
where the second equality follows from
M12 =
Ã
·x + 2·
M03; (B.9)
using (44). The skewness SX of stationary wealth is then given by
SX ´
M30
¾3
X
=
2
p
·x(· + ·x)3
(2·x + ·)(·x + 2·)
SY ; (B.10)
where the skewness SY of stationary income is given by
SY ´
M03
¾3
Y
=
2
p
2·
3
¸0±3
¡
¾2
0 + ¸0±2
¢3=2: (B.11)
Similarly, (47) implies that
M40 =
3Ã2
·x(3·x + ·)
M22; (B.12)
where applying (44), (45), and (46) leaves
M22 =
1
2(·x + ·)
·
¡
¾2
0 + ¸0±2
¢ Ã2
·x(·x + ·)
M02 + 2ÃM13
¸
; (B.13)
M13 =
1
·x + 3·
·
3
¡
¾2
0 + ¸0±2
¢ Ã
·x + ·
M02 + ÃM04
¸
; (B.14)
M21 =
2Ã
2·x + ·
M12 =
2Ã2
(2·x + ·)(·x + ·)
M03: (B.15)
Therefore,
M40 =
3¸0±4Ã4
4·x·(3·x + ·)(3· + ·x)(·x + ·)
+ 3M2
20: (B.16)
The excess kurtosis KX of wealth is then given by
KX ´
M40
M2
20
¡ 3 =
3·x(· + ·x)
(· + 3·x)(3· + ·x)
KY ; (B.17)
where the excess kurtosis KY of income is
KY =
M04
M2
02
¡ 3 =
¸0±4·
(¾2
0 + ¸0±2)2 ¸ 0: (B.18)
27B.2 Moments Calculations for Section 4.6
The stationary distribution for (56) is Gamma with a rate parameter ¸ = 2·=¾2 and a scale
parameter º = 2·µ=¾2, in that
f1(y) =
¸
¡(º)
(¸y)
º¡1 e¡¸y; (B.19)
where ¡(¢) is the Gamma function. The second, third and fourth centered moments of
stationary income are
M02 =
¾2µ
2·
; M03 =
¾4µ
2·2; M04 =
3¾4µ
4·3
¡
·µ + ¾2¢
=
3¾6µ
4·3 + 3M2
02:
Equation (47) implies that
M30 =
2Ã2
·x(2·x + ·)
M12 =
2Ã3
·x(2·x + ·)(·x + ·)
M03; (B.20)
where the second equality follows from (44), in that
M12 =
¾2M11 + ÃM03
·x + 2·
=
1
·x + 2·
µ
¾2 Ã
·x + ·
¾2µ
2·
+ Ã
¾4µ
2·2
¶
=
Ã
·x + ·
M03:
The skewness SX of stationary wealth is then given by
SX ´
M30
¾3
X
=
2
p
·x(· + ·x)
2·x + ·
SY ; (B.21)
where the skewness of stationary income is SY = m03=¾3
Y =
p
2¾2=
p
·µ:
Similarly, (47) implies that the fourth moment M40 of wealth is given by
M40 =
3Ã2
·x(3·x + ·)
M22; (B.22)
where applying (44), (45), and (46) leaves
M22 =
1
2(·x + ·)
¡
¾2M21 + ¾2µM20 + 2ÃM13
¢
; (B.23)
M13 =
1
·x + 3·
¡
3¾2M12 + 3¾2µM11 + ÃM04
¢
=
Ã
·x + ·
M04; (B.24)
M21 =
2Ã
2·x + ·
M12 =
2Ã2
(2·x + ·)(·x + ·)
M03: (B.25)
Together, the fourth moment of wealth is given by
M40 =
3Ã4¾6µ(5· + 6·x)
4·x·3(3·x + ·)(2·x + ·)(·x + ·)2 + 3M2
20: (B.26)
The excess kurtosis KX of wealth is then given by
KX ´
M40
M2
20
¡ 3 =
·x(5· + 6·x)
(3·x + ·)(2·x + ·)
KY ; (B.27)
where the excess kurtosis of income is KY = M04=¾4
Y ¡ 3 = 3¾2=·µ:
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